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Child Support And (In)ability To Pay: The
Case For The Cost Shares Model
PAMELA FOOHEY*
ABSTRACT
Currently enacted child support guidelines
primarily focus on maintaining children's
economic well-being when a single household is
split into two. This article argues that this focus
discounts another consideration which, when
combined with the current analysis, could further
advance children's well-being: the ability of
parents to pay. An analysis of payment
characteristics demonstrates that lower child
support obligations may increase the amount of
child support paid on average. Lowering
presumptive obligations will make lower-income
parents better able and more likely to pay their
obligations, thereby increasing the amount of child
support paid to lower-income children, while at
most only marginally decreasing the amount of
support paid by middle and upper income parents,
which, when paid at all, usually exceeds the
minimum obligations established by guidelines.
The Cost Shares model of child support guidelines
implicitly incorporates payment ability into the
existing analysis, yielding slightly lower
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obligations, and thereby making it a better and
easily implemented alternative to current
guidelines.
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I. Introduction
Since their implementation in the late 1980s, 1 child
support guidelines have focused primarily on preserving
individual children's economic well-being. 2  With this in
mind, current debates about child support guidelines
concentrate on how to balance the trade-offs implicit in
splitting a single household into two separate households:
guidelines balance between not making individual children
economically worse-off when their parents divorce, equalizing
the economic well-being of the two resulting households, and
distributing money to each resulting household based on
which household would derive the greatest utility from the
money. 3  In so balancing, the debate discounts another
consideration that, when taken into greater account, also may
advance children's well-being: the ability of parents to pay. It
is this consideration that this article explores, arguing that
lower absolute child support obligations4 may increase the
amount of child support paid on average, and that of proposed
guidelines, the Cost Shares model is a better alternative to
currently enacted guidelines because its unique balancing
yields child support obligations that encourage payment.
Lowering presumptive child support obligations will
make lower-income obligors (payers of child support) better
able and thus more likely to pay those obligations, thereby
increasing the amount of child support paid to lower-income
1 The Family Support Act of 1988 required states to implement mandatory
numeric child support guidelines by May 1990. Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
2 See Tim Graves, Comment, Child Support Guidelines Encourage Forum
Shopping, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 287 (1999).
3 David Betson, et al., Trade-Offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11
J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 5 - 10 (1992).
4 In this article, the terms child support award, child support obligation,
child support order, and child support payment are used interchangeably.
The term child support award generally refers to the amount payable to the
parent receiving child support (which is then to be used for the benefit of
the children), while the terms child support obligation, child support order,
and child support payment generally refer to the amount payable by the
parent owing child support.
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children, while at most only marginally decreasing the amount
of child support paid by middle and upper income obligors,
which, when paid at all, usually exceeds the minimum
obligations established by current guidelines, and, thus, should
remain constant despite lower obligations. Overall, the setting
of child support is better approached by incorporating the goal
of increasing the total amount of child support paid into the
current analysis; this approach has the potential to provide
more child support for children on average, thereby advancing
the best interests of children, while still preserving the insights
into balancing upon which current guidelines are premised.
Although new guidelines can be created or current guidelines
better tailored to account for the ability of obligors to pay, a
guideline already exists for states to implement that
incorporates this perspective into the existing analysis: the
Cost Shares model, which provides lower child support
obligations at almost all levels of obligor income.
5
The key to maximizing the total amount of child
support paid is to explore the payment characteristics of
obligors: when they do not pay, when they do pay, and when
they pay more than the presumptive obligation yielded by
child support guidelines. Research shows that non-paying
obligors, generally known as "deadbeat dads" (fathers are the
obligors in most cases6), do not pay their child support
obligations for a number of reasons falling into two broad
categories: they do not have the financial resources to pay, or
they do not want to and do not intend to pay despite having the
5 Laura W. Morgan, The "Cost Shares" Model of Child Support Guidelines
(2004), available at
http://www.supportguidelines.com/articles/art200407.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008) (noting that the Cost Shares model "adopts the standard
(target) of spending on the child in the post divorce situation ... this is a
lower normative standard") (emphasis in original).
6 One study found that fathers comprise less than 20 percent of custodial
parents receiving child support to be spent on their children. Pamela J.
Smock &Wendy D. Manning, Nonresident Parents' Characteristics and
Child Support, 59 J. OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 798 (1997).
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financial capacity to do so. 7 Focusing on those who do not
have the financial resources to pay, research also shows that
these obligors would pay if they had the financial capacity to
do so,8 and that many could afford to pay smaller child
support obligations consistently.9 Accordingly, lowering child
support obligations should increase the amount of child
support actually paid by lower-income obligors in aggregate,
thereby providing more child support for children on average,
especially for children from lower-income households.
Moreover, there is evidence that some divorcing and
divorced parents mutually agree to deviate upward from the
presumptive child support obligation yielded by guidelines in
an effort to better reflect the cost of continuing to raise their
children at their current standard of living, or otherwise
modify their child support arrangement to provide increased
monetary support.10 These deviations are upheld by judges,
who also deviate from the presumptive obligations in some
situations.11 In most instances, it is the presence of one or
more higher-earning parent that leads parents and judges to
deviate from the presumptive obligation-that is, in a
percentage of cases (possibly a high percentage of cases)
involving middle and high income parents, the guidelines are
used merely as guidance. 12 Thus, decreasing child support
7 See Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real
World Intrudes Upon Academics and Advocates, 33 FAM. L. Q. 235
(1999).
8 See, e.g., Judi Bartfeld & Daniel R. Meyer, Are There Really Deadbeat
Dads?: The Relationship Between Ability to Pay, Enforcement, and
Compliance in Nonmarital Child Support Cases, 68 SOc. SERV. REv. 219
(1994).
9 See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, THE POLITICS OF CHILD SUPPORT IN
AMERICA 162, 165 (2003).
1o See Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493
(1995); Stephen K. Erickson, Family Law: If They Can Do Parenting
Plans, They Can Do Child Support Plans, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 827
(2007).
11 See Kathleen A. Hogan, The Big Case: Issues in High Income/High
Asset Cases: Child Support in High Income Cases, 17 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW 349 (2001).
12 See id.; Altman, supra note 10; Erikson, supra note 10.
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payment amounts should not cause the actual amount of child
support paid by many higher income obligors to decline.
Combining these insights leads to the counterintuitive
conclusion that decreasing presumptive child support
obligations has the potential to increase the amount of child
support paid in aggregate. Indeed, when obligor payment
characteristics are explored thoroughly, guidelines that
provide lower obligation amounts have the potential to
increase the average child support paid per child while only
decreasing what some individual children receive in a small
percentage of cases. This article develops this conclusion in
depth in support of the Cost Shares model, which is criticized
as not being in the best interests of children precisely because
it provides lower child support obligations at almost every
level of obligor income, and which, accordingly, has been
discarded by states. 13 In building the case made for the Cost
Shares model, this article generally argues for a more nuanced
approach to child support, an approach that includes the ability
of parents to pay.
In order to fully examine how child support guidelines
approach preserving children's economic well-being, this
article first surveys the current debate surrounding child
support guidelines. Part II of this article discusses the history
of child support guidelines, focusing on the three prevailing
guidelines and the Cost Shares model, and highlighting the
compromises each strikes in balancing the trade-offs inherent
in splitting one household into two. Part III compares the
three prevailing guidelines and the Cost Shares model across a
13 Though introduced, the Cost Shares model has not been fully enacted by
any state legislature. It has been partially enacted, without explicit
recognition, in a few states. For example, Michigan treats child care
expenses as additional to the basic child support amount: "The out-of-
pocket expense paid by the custodial parent for child care is reduced by the
child care credit the custodial parent will claim against income taxes; the
balance after subtracting the credit must be paid by the parents in
proportion to their incomes." The Cost Shares model handles this and
many other child care expenses in the same way. Donald J. Bieniewicz,
Improving State Child Support Guidelines (1999), available at
http://www.guidelineeconomics.com/files/VABieniewiczl999.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
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spectrum of obligor and obligee income points to better
demonstrate how the balance each guidelines strikes causes
child support obligations to vary depending on the guidelines.
Next, this article turns to the previously
underdeveloped consideration of parents' ability to pay. Part
IV discusses why some obligors do not pay their child support
obligations, and what causes parents and judges to deviate
from the guidelines. Part V connects the evidence of non-
payment and deviation presented in Part IV with the
comparisons of the child support guidelines in Part III to
develop the case for the Cost Shares model. Finally, Part VI
offers some concluding thoughts.
II. History and Types of Child Support Guidelines
Prior to the late 1980s, child support obligations were
determined by judges on a case-by-case basis. Although some
states implemented child support guidelines voluntarily, and
general rules of thumb and case law governed child support
obligations in other states, overall the traditional case-by-case
method was inadequate and problematic: analysts believed
that awards often were deficient as compared to the true cost
of raising children; obligations were inconsistent, resulting in
unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals; and the
adjudication of obligations was inefficient without consistent
standards. 14 To remedy these problems, the Family Support
Act of 1988 ("the Act") required states to implement
mandatory numeric child support guidelines. 15  These
quantitative guidelines set presumptive child support
obligations; if a judge or court wishes to deviate from the
presumptive obligation, the judge or court must explain why
the obligation is "unjust or inappropriate" in the specific
14 See Robert G. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support
Orders, 21 FAM. L. Q. 281, 282 (1987); R. Mark Rogers, Wisconsin-Style
and Income Shares Child Support Guidelines: Excessive Burdens and
Flawed Economic Foundation, 33 FAM L. Q. 135, 135 (1999).
15 Family Support Act, supra note 1.
Vol. 13:1
Child Support and In(ability) to Pay
case.16  The Act also requires states to review their child
support guidelines every four years.
1 7
In response to the mandate, states have enacted three
prevailing types of guidelines: the percentage of income
standard, the Income Shares model, and the Delaware Melson
Formula. 18 In addition to the three main types of guidelines,
two recommended guidelines have gained attention, although
neither has been enacted by any state: the American Law
Institute's (ALl) Child Support Principles and the Cost Shares
model. Each of these five guidelines seeks to balance the
implicit trade-offs in splitting one household into two, as
almost all divorces necessitate. All of the guidelines aim to
preserve children's economic well-being, but differences in
formulae based on this balancing result in different child
support obligations for similarly situated parents (parents
whose financial resources are the same) across states. 19
Nevertheless, the implementation of these guidelines has led
to an increase in child support awards (and, consequently,
obligations), greater consistency, and more efficient case
processing as compared to pre-guidelines awards and child
support case processing.20
16 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2008). "Effective October 13, 1989, the State
must provide that there shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or
administrative proceeding for the award of child support, that the amount
of the award which would result from the application of the guidelines...
is the correct amount of child support to be awarded." Guidelines For
Setting Child Support Awards, 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(f) (2008). "A written
finding or specific finding on the record . . . that the application of the
guidelines ... would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case shall be
sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case, as determined under
criteria by the State. Such criteria must take into consideration the best
interests of the child." 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(g).
17 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(e) ("The State must review, and revise, if
appropriate, the guidelines ... at least once every four years to ensure that
their application results in the determination of appropriate child support
award amounts.").18 See Rogers, supra note 14, at 135 - 36.
19 See Graves, supra note 2.
20 See Nancy Thoennes, et. al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on
Award Adequacy, Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25
FAM. L. Q. 325, 345 (1991). It is estimated that the adoption of child
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This Part goes on to discuss the three prevailing child
21support guidelines and the Cost Shares model in detail,
highlighting how each calculates child support obligations, the
balance that each attempts to strike through its calculations,
how that balancing translates numerically to presumptive child
support obligations, and common criticisms levied against
each.
A. Percentage of Income Standard
The simplest of the guidelines is the percentage of
income standard. It currently is enacted in fourteen states. 22
The percentage of income standard calculates child support
obligations by applying a set percentage to the income of the
obligor parent (some states apply the percentage to gross
23income, while others use net income). The obligation
usually is calculated independent of the income of the
custodial parent, who is assumed to meet his or her obligation
by living with and caring for the child.24
support guidelines more than doubled child support obligations, increasing
obligations from $10 billion to $27 billion in 1979. William S. Comanor,
Child Support Payments: A Review of Current Policies, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 1, 4 (William S. Comanor, ed.,
2004).
21 As this article's main purpose is to make a case for the Cost Shares
model as a better alternative to currently enacted child support guidelines,
the ALI's Principles are not discussed in depth. For a brief discussion of
the Principles, see infra Part lI.D.
22 Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin use the
percentage of income standard. Massachusetts uses a hybrid version of the
percentage of income standard. What State Uses What Guideline,
GUIDELINE ECONOMICS,
http://www.guidelineeconomics.com/about/whichstate.htm (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008). Though this table categorizes Georgia's guidelines as
following the Income Shares model, as discussed infra note 33 and
accompanying text, Georgia's guidelines are better characterized as one of
the most robust variations of the percentage of income standard.
23 See Jane C. Venohr & Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and
Periodic Review of State Child Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L. Q. 7, 10
(1999).
24 See Laurie J. Bassi & Burt S. Barrow, Expenditures on Children and
Child Support Guidelines, 3 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 478, 486 (1993).
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There are two variations of the percentage of income
standard. The "flat percentage model" calculates child support
based on a fixed percentage across all levels of income of the
obligor parent. Stated differently, "under the [fllat
[p]ercentage [m]odel, the percentage of income devoted to
child support remains constant at all income levels. 26  In
contrast, the "varying percentage model" applies different
percentages to different levels of income such that "the
percentage of [obligor] income devoted to child support varies
according to level of income. ' 27 In addition, states vary as to
how they determine the base level of income to which the
28percentages are applied. In all states that employ the
percentage of income standard, the percentage varies based on
the number of children supported, and, in some states, based
29
on the children's ages.
In essence, the percentage of income standard is best
thought of as a tax, with some states applying a flat tax
regardless of the level of obligor income, and others applying
a graded tax, similar to federal personal income tax.- For
example, Wisconsin and Minnesota apply a flat percentage
based on the number of children supported to obligor income
regardless of the level of obligor income. Wisconsin's model
applies the following percentages to the obligor's gross
income: 17 percent for one child, 25 percent for two children,
and 29 percent for three children. 31 Similarly, Minnesota's
model applies the following percentages to the obligor's net
income: 25 percent for one child, 30 percent for two children,
and 35 percent for three children. 32 In contrast, Georgia's
model applies a varying percentage based on the combined
level of obligor and obligee (receiver of child support)
25 See LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION § 1.03(c)(1) (1996 & Supp. 2007).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Bassi & Barrow, supra note 24, at 487.
29 See MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(c)(1).
30 See Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 12 (noting that the percentage
of income standard "emulate[s] a tax").
31 Id. at 10- 12.
32 id.
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income, thereby making Georgia's model one of the most
robust variations of the percentage of income standard
currently enacted.33
The main goal of the percentage of income standard is
to preserve individual children's economic well-being such
that children are not made economically worse-off when their
parents divorce. 34 In furtherance of this goal, the percentage
of income standard transfers a sizable portion of the non-
custodial parent's income to the custodial parent regardless of
the relative impact on the non-custodial parent's standard of
living. In addition, except standards similar to Georgia's
model, the percentage of income standard does not consider
the level of income of the custodial parent.
35
By attempting to transfer enough money to the
custodial parent so that individual children's standards of
living are not negatively impacted by their parents' divorces,
the percentage of income standard tends to yield numerically
high child support obligations, especially as compared to the
other guidelines, which will be confirmed by the calculations
and comparisons in Part III. Also, the flat percentage
variation model tends to yield higher obligations than the
varying percentage model, particularly at lower levels of
obligor income.
The main criticism levied against the percentage of
income standard is that the percentage applied to income does
not decrease as income increases (and as the percentage of
36income spent on children decreases). This fault is remedied
to a degree by the use of a variable percentage model based on
income level to determine obligations and the use of standards
to set a cap on obligations at a specific income level.37
33 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (2007).
34 David Betson, et al., Trade-Offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11
J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 7 (1992).
35 Id. at 7. The percentage of income standard reflects the premises
advanced by the maintenance support formulae discussed in Betson's
article.
36 See MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(c)(2).
37 See id.
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In addition, the percentage of income standard is
criticized as being inherently unfair in not taking into account
the custodial parent's income. 38 Although this omission may
make the percentage of income standard simpler and easier to
apply and understand, critics argue that the claim that "both
parents are assumed to contribute to the child's upbringing in
the same proportion as the obligor" because the standard
implicitly presumes that "[t]he custodial parent is making the
contribution in the manner he or should would have made had
the parties not divorced," is based on a faulty rationale that
does not reflect economic reality.
39
Beyond these critiques, and in contrast to the main
criticism levied against it (and implicit in the argument against
not taking into account the custodial parent's income), the
percentage of income standard also should be more explicitly
criticized for unrealistically expecting lower-income obligors
to be financially able to pay such a large percentage of their
income in child support, even if such a higher percentage is
necessary to maintain their children's economic well-being.
The extra expenses associated with establishing and
maintaining a new (and permanent) household, even if that
new household is nothing more than a small apartment,
combined with other costs of divorce and permanent
separation, leaves little for child support.40 While it can be
claimed that fathers (who are the obligors in most cases)
should be forced to follow through with their commitments,
the reality is many lower-income fathers (including some
middle-class fathers) are not financially able to pay such a
high percentage of their income in child support without
sacrificing their minimal economic well-being, a minimal
38 See id.
39 Id. The percentage of income standard also is criticized for not
considering adjustments for "child care, extraordinary medical expenses,
shared or split custody, [or] serial family development .... [W]here such
commonly occurring factors need to be dealt with as deviations rather than
part of the formula, the goal of consistency and predictability is lost." Id.
40 See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE
115 - 121 (2003).
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economic well-being that may be necessary in order to sustain
their income levels or merely to sustain a healthy life.
41
Indeed, the Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement has itself found and has commissioned studies
that find that obligations are too high in some low-income
obligor cases because low-income obligors simply do not have
enough income. For instance, in a 1993 memorandum to state
agencies regarding the administration of child support
enforcement plans, the Office of Child Support Enforcement
counseled that, "[i]n some cases, a downward adjustment may
even be advantageous to the child if it results in an amount of
support which can be paid fully, regularly, and timely by the
obligor. An unrealistic order, which is inconsistent with the
guidelines and the obligor's ability to pay, may result in only
sporadic payments or none whatsoever."4 2 Similarly, in 2000,
the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of
Inspector General concluded that payment rates by low-
income non-custodial parents could be improved by "setting
realistic support obligations.
'
"
43
In short, as will be developed further in Part IV's
discussion of obligor payment characteristics, fathers will only
pay as much as they can, and the percentage of income
standard expects many lower-income fathers to pay their way
into a version of poverty that is counter-productive. Thus, the
major problem with the percentage of income standard is not
that its flat percentage (even if that flat percentage comes in
steps as under the varying percentage model) forces higher-
income obligors to pay more than necessary to maintain their
41 id.
42 Role of IV-D Agency and Its Staff in Delivering Program Services:
Information Memorandum, THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, July 23, 1993,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/IM/1993/im-9303.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
43 The Establishment of Child Support Orders for Low Income Non-
Custodial Parents, Department of Health and Human Services, Office of
Inspector General (July 2000), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-99-00390.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2008).
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children's economic well-being; the problem is that its flat
percentage asks too much of lower-income obligors.
B. Income Shares Model
The Income Shares model is the most popular child
support guideline, and currently is enacted in thirty-six
states." Building upon the critiques of the percentage of
income standard, the Income Shares model takes into account
both the obligor's and obligee's income. In this way, it is best
thought of as a "cost-sharing mechanism. '45  It sets child
support obligations by first determining what proportion of
their combined income the divorcing parents spent on their
children in an intact household.46 This determination is based
on economic data estimating child-rearing expenses; the
applicable base child-rearing expense amount is adjusted
according to extraordinary expenses unique to the divorcing
couple's children such as child care and medical expenses.
The final amount, termed the "basic child support obligation,"
is then pro-rated between the two parents based on their
relative incomes.
48
For example, assume that the custodial parent's yearly
income is $50,000, the non-custodial parent's yearly income is
$70,000, 25 percent of the parents combined income was spent
on their two children in an intact household, and there are no
extraordinary expenses. The $30,000 "basic child support
obligation" would be apportioned $12,500 to the custodial
parent and $17,500 to the non-custodial parent. Accordingly,
44 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming use the Income Shares
model. What State Uses What Guideline, supra note 22.
45 Bassi & Barrow, supra note 24, at 487 (internal quotations omitted).
46 MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(b)(1).
47 Id.
48 id.
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the non-custodial parent would owe the custodial parent
$17,500 per year in child support for their two children.
Similar to the percentage of income standard, some
states calculate obligations according to gross income, while
others base awards on net income.50  Also, child-rearing
expense estimates vary slightly state-to-state.
51
Like the percentage of income standard, the Income
Shares model also attempts to preserve individual children's
economic well-being:
The Income Shares model is based on the
precept that the child should receive the same
proportion of parental income that would have
been received if the parents lived together.
Thus, the Income Shares model calculates child
support as the share of each parent's income
estimated to have been allocated to the child if
the parents and child were living in an intact
household.52
But unlike the percentage of income standard, the
Income Shares model explicitly calculates child support based
on both parents' incomes, and, thereby, as compared to the
percentage of income standard, tends to yield similar child
support obligations in cases in which the parents' income is
about the same, but yields higher or lower obligations when
the parents' incomes are divergent. This result is illustrated in
Part III.
The main criticism levied against the Income Shares
model is that it is based on faulty economic research and data
that inaccurately estimates the cost of raising children,
49 The figures in this example were chosen for their ease of calculation and
do not reflect actual Income Shares model guidelines. For a more detailed
explanation of the Income Shares model calculation, see Robert G.
Williams, supra note 14, at 291 - 94.
50 MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(b)(2).
51 See Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 14.
52 Robert G. Williams, supra note 14, at 292.
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especially children from higher-income households. 53  The
Income Shares model was developed by the Institute for Court
Management of the National Center for State Courts under the
54Child Support Guidelines Project. Its developers relied on
and wrote into the model tables reflecting estimates of child-
rearing expenses derived from a study by Dr. Thomas
Espenshade that calculated the percentage of income parents
in an intact household spend on children at varying income
levels. 55  Although many states subsequently updated their
child support schedules with more current estimates of child-
rearing expenses based on data provided from the Bureau of
Labor Statistic's Consumer Expenditure Survey,56  the
differences between the new tables and the tables based on
Espenshade's analysis are marginal.57 Critics contend that all
these tables contain fundamental flaws: the tables do not
include many joint consumptions items (those items that
benefit all family members, such as heating and other housing
expenditures), 58 and the tables are based on under-reported
income and under-reported expenses. 59  Accordingly, it is
contended that child support obligations yielded by the
Income Shares model are economically unreliable.
53 MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(b)(2). See also Ira Mark Ellman,
Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis Used to Construct Child Support
Guidelines, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 167 (2004); Morgan, supra note 5.54 See Robert G. Williams, supra note 14, at 291.
55 See id., at 292 - 93; Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 12. See also
THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATES OF
PARENTAL EXPENDITURES (1984).
56 See Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 14; Ellman, supra note 53, at
199.
57 Compare the tables in Robert G. Williams, supra note 14, at 292 - 93
with the table in Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 14.
58 Ellman, supra note 53, at 183.
59 Id. at 208 - 16. R. Mark Rogers & Donald J. Bieniewicz, Child Cost
Economics and Litigation Issues: An Introduction to Applying Cost Shares
Child Support Guidelines 6 (2002),
http://www.guidelineeconomics.com/files/Litigationlssues.pdf (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008) ("The bottom line is that the ... tables for child costs-at
every cost level-are based on more income than the parents actually
have.").
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Beyond this criticism and a general critique of the
underlying balance the Income Shares model strikes (a
criticism common to each of the enacted guidelines), the
Income Shares model generally is commended for preserving
children's economic well-being while adjusting for the
tendency of the percentage of income standard to decrease the
non-custodial parent's standard of living, especially in cases in
which the parents' income is divergent (such as a high earning
custodial parent and a low earning non-custodialXarent), and
while retaining a relatively easy to apply formula. However,
though the Income Shares model may yield numerically lower
child support obligations for lower-income obligors as the
other parent's income increases, it still unrealistically expects
some lower-income obligors to be financially able to pay a
large percentage of their incomes in child support. Thus, the
Income Shares model's solution to the biases in the percentage
of income standard does not fully address how to handle some
obligors lack of financial means and leaves some lower-
income obligors in the same position as they were under the
percentage of income standard: financially incapable of
paying their entire obligations even if they sincerely want to
support their children.
C. Delaware Melson Formula
The Delaware Melson Formula (the "Melson
Formula") was first implemented by Judge Elwood Melson,
Jr. in Delaware in 1979, and currently is used in three states.6
1
It has been characterized as "a more complicated version of
the Income Shares model ' 62 and as "the most comprehensive
approach., 63 The Melson Formula is a three-step calculation.
First, the net income of each parent is calculated; from this net
income, a self-support reserve is subtracted. 64 Second, each
parent's remaining income is applied to a pre-determined
60 See Bassi & Barrow, supra note 24, at 489.
61 See id. Delaware, Hawaii, and Montana use the Melson Formula. What
State Uses What Guideline, supra note 22.
62 MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(d)(1).
63 Robert G. Williams, supra note 14, at 322.
64 Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 16.
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primary support need for the child or children. This primary
support need is calculated from the economic data underlying
the tables used in the Income Shares model.6' Third, "[t]o the
extent that either parent has income available after covering
the self-support reserve and his or her share of the child's [or
children's] primary support needs, an additional percentage of
the remaining income is applied to the child support
,,66obligation. The total child support obligation for eachparent is calculated by adding steps two and three.67
For example, the current Delaware guidelines
incorporate a self-support reserve of $970 per month, and
provide a minimum child support obligation based on the
number of children ($720 per month for two children
assuming the Xarents' combined income is sufficient to pay
that amount). This minimum child support obligation is
increased by a set percentage to reflect an appropriate standard
of living adjustment (24% of remaining net income in the case
of two children).69
Like the percentage of income standard and the
Income Shares model, the Melson Formula begins with the
premise that children should not be made worse-off because of
their parent's divorce. However, the Melson Formula
incorporates several policy judgments as to what may make
children worse-off: most notably, it presumes that "the
support of others is impossible until one's own basic support
needs are met" and that higher income parents "should share
their additional incomes with their children, improving their
children's standard of living as their own standard of living
improves." 7
0
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 The Family Court of the State of Delaware: Delaware Child Support
Formula Evaluation and Update 12, 14 (October 2, 2006),
http://courts.state.de.us/How%20To/Support/?ChildSupportGuidelinesEdV
121106.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
61 Id. at 12.
70 MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(d)(1).
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These premises cause the Melson Formula to yield
child support obligations similar to those required under the
percentage of income standard and Income Shares model in
cases in which the parents' income is similar, but produce less
extreme standard of living differences between the two
resulting households when the parents' income is divergent.
In addition, because of its self-support reserve, the Melson
Formula tends to yield obligations that are lower when the
parents' income is lower as compared to the other two
guidelines, and because of its sharing of additional income, it
tends to yield higher obligations when the parents' income is
higher as compared to the other two guidelines. 71 These
results are confirmed in Part III.
Though the Melson Formula is more internally
consistent than the other two models because it takes into
account both the parents' needs and the children's needs,
which causes it to be deemed fairer, it is criticized because its
calculations seem more complicated than the other two
models. 72 As it relies on similar economic data as the Income
Shares model, it is also criticized for yielding economically
unreliable child support obligations.73 Further, like the other
two models, the Melson Formula should be criticized for
expecting lower-income obligors to pay more than financially
feasible. But because the Melson Formula includes an
allowance for basic needs, it is not the lowest income obligors
that are the most likely to not be able to financially pay; rather,
it is those obligors whose income falls at the low end of
"middle income" that are required to pay substantial portions
of their incomes in order to equalize the standards of living
across the two resulting households. 74 And it is in these cases
that the obligors are unable to afford their child support
obligations without slipping close to the poverty line on which
the allowance for basic needs is built, a line that may not allow
71 See Betson, supra note 3, at 14.
72 MORGAN, supra note 25, at § 1.03(d)(2).
73 See Ellman, supra note 53.
14 See infra Part III.
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them to maintain a life that permits them to sustain their
current level of income.
75
The exploration of the Income Shares model's and the
Melson Formula's economic unreliability also leads critics to
observe that all three prevailing child support guidelines strike
a balance that makes the fairness judgment that children's
economic well-being should be preserved as much as possible,
which some view not to be in the best interests of the child.76
This observation has led to the creation of other child support
models, most notably the Cost Shares model, which is
discussed next, and the ALI's Child Support Principles, which
is discussed briefly in contrast to the Costs Shares model.
D. Cost Shares Model
The proposed Cost Shares model addresses the
complexities of splitting one household into two much
differently from the three prevailing guidelines. The basic
Cost Shares model is a four-step calculation: first, basic child
costs for a single-parent household are determined based on
the average of both parents' income; second, other expenses,
such as child care and medical expenses, are added; third, the
tax benefit received by the custodial parent is deducted from
total child costs; and fourth, the resulting child costs are
allocated "between the two parents based on each parent's
share of after-tax income that is above a recommended self-
support level. 77  Even when compared to the relatively
complex Melson Formula, this calculation makes the Cost
Shares model by far the most robust model because it takes
into account more variations in individuals' circumstances.
75 See supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text.
76 Ellman, supra note 53, at 183 (noting that when "parents do not have
equal incomes, then the marginal expenditure model[, upon which the three
prevailing child support guidelines are premised,] yields a result that is
harder to defend," as opposed to when parents do have equal incomes, in
which case, an "award based upon marginal child expenditures seems to
satisfy fully the most expansive plausible claim that [children] could
make").
77 Rogers & Bieniewicz, supra note 59, at 13 - 14.
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This calculation also reflects the balance the Cost
Shares model attempts to strike. Instead of focusing solely on
maintaining children's pre-divorce standard of living, the Cost
Shares model seeks to establish obligations based on realistic
actual expenditures of households. In so doing, the Cost
Shares model does not base its calculations on the economic
data that has come under criticism; 79 rather, it bases child
support obligations on what custodial parents spend on their
children after household dissolution. 80 The Cost Shares model
also explicitly includes poverty thresholds for both parents and
accounts for the beneficial tax treatment accruing to custodial
parents that helps to improve custodial parents' standards of
living. 8
1
Its assumptions and the way it balances interests cause
the Cost Shares model to yield lower child support obligations
as compared with the three prevailing guidelines at every level
of obligor income except when the parents' incomes are both
close to the poverty level.82 It is these lower obligations that
bring criticism to the Cost Shares model, both from those who
view fairness as designing guidelines that seek to not make
children economically worse-off when their parents divorce,
and from those who view a different balance as in the best
interests of children. 83 The Cost Shares model's lower awards
especially come under fire from those in favor of the ALI's
Child Support Principles (the "Principles"), which are
discussed briefly to highlight the lower versus higher award
debate.
78 R. Mark Rogers & Donald J. Bieniewicz, Child Support Guidelines:
Underlying Methodologies, Assumptions, and the Impact on Standards of
Living, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 60, 71
(William S. Comanor, ed., 2004).
79 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
80 See Morgan, supra note 5.
81 See Rogers & Bieniewicz, supra note 59, at 8 (noting that the custodial
parent will "enjoy a higher presumptive standard of living than the non-
custodial parent in most income situations-even when the custodial
parent earns significantly less prior to the child support transfer" because
of the beneficial tax treatment).
82 See Morgan, supra note 5.
83 See Ellman, supra note" 53.
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Like the Cost Shares model, the Principles approach
child support from a perspective other than not making
individual children economically worse-off when their parents
divorce. Specifically, the Principles seek to identify ways to
increase total utility by distributing money to each household
based on which household would derive the greatest utility
from that money.84  For example, when the non-custodial
parent's income is higher than the custodial parent's income,
and thus the custodial parent's household has a lower standard
of living, the Principles provide increased child support to the
custodial household to narrow the standard of living gap.
85
Similarly, when the custodial parent's household's standard of
living is higher than the non-custodial parent's, the child
support obligation is lower.86 The major difference between
the Principles and the Cost Shares model is that while
recognizing that child support payments may be burdensome
to obligor parents, especially lower-income obligor parents,
the Principles do not try to fully protect the interests of the
obligor parent if that parent's standard of living is
substantially higher than the residential parent's. 87 The result
is higher child support obligations.
Perhaps as expected, generally it is fathers' rights
groups who support the Cost Shares model and feminists who
support the Principles. 88 But supporters of guidelines that tend
to yield numerically higher child support obligations may not
be as in opposition to supporters of guidelines that yield
slightly lower obligations as they think they are. It is
84 See Betson, supra note 3, at 9.
85 See Leslie Joan Harris, Commentary, The ALl Child Support Principles:
Incremental Changes to Improve the Lot of Children and Residential
Parents, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 245, 248 (2001).
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See CROWLEY, supra note 9, at 189 (noting that fathers' rights groups'
"central goal has been to modify child support awards, usually in a
downward direction" and that fathers' rights groups have backed the Cost
Shares model); Ellman, supra note 53, at 215 ("Any revision of child
support guidelines presents the potential for a contest between feminist and
father's rights groups."); Morgan, supra note 5 (noting that the Cost Shares
model "has received support among non-custodial parents").
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uncontroversial that the underlying motivating goal of child
support is to properly compensate the expenditures made by
custodial parents on their children that should be paid by the
non-custodial parents-in short, to provide money to custodial
parents. Child support guidelines meet this imperative by
identifying how best to balance the tradeoffs implicit in
dividing a household to advance the best interests of children.
All three of the enacted guidelines seek to preserve individual
children's economic well-being. In basing its obligations on
realistic actual expenditures of post-divorce households, the
Cost Shares model identifies and incorporates another
consideration upon which guidelines should focus: the ability
of parents to pay. When payment ability is explored in depth,
as is done in Part IV, it becomes apparent that more children
will receive more support if obligors are required to pay less,
thereby leaving more children better-off, assuming better-off
is defined as actually receiving payment. Thus, contrary to
current criticism, the Cost Shares model should be praised for
adequately considering what obligors actually are able to pay.
The next part of this article graphically explores and
then analyzes how the balance each of the three enacted child
support guidelines and the Cost Shares model strikes translates
to presumptive child support obligations, focusing
predominantly on child support obligations of lower-income
obligors to demonstrate how it may be that lower-income
obligors cannot financially pay their child support obligations
despite their desire to support their children.
III. The Prevailing Guidelines and the Cost Shares Model
Compared
As noted, the concerns inherent in designing guidelines
are balanced differently by each of the child support
guidelines. 89 This difference in balancing necessarily causes
the guidelines to yield divergent child support obligations
89 See Bassi & Barrow, supra note 24, at 494 ("For example, the
percentage of income guideline is simpler to implement and update than
the Income Shares or Melson guideline, but it ignores some equity issues
that some states believe are important, for example, taking both parents'
incomes into account.").
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across the spectrum of obligor and obligee income points.
This part graphically compares and analyzes the three
prevailing guidelines currently enacted and the Cost Shares
model across a spectrum of obligor and obligee income points
to demonstrate how child support obligations vary across the
guidelines, focusing particularly on lower-income obligors.
A. Calculations
To create the graphs in sub-part B, child support
obligations (paid from the non-custodial parent to the
custodial parent) are calculated based on hypothetical monthly
gross income of $1,000 to $8,000 (in increments of $100) for
each parent, for a total of seventy hypothetical monthly gross
income points per parent and 4,900 child support obligation
permutations for each of the guidelines.
90
To numerically compare the child support obligations
yielded by the three prevailing guidelines and the Cost Shares
model, the same assumptions necessarily must be made in
calculating obligations under each of the guidelines. For
simplicity, it is assumed that the divorcing couple has two
children and has elected to have the children spend a majority
of their time with and live with the mother (the custodial
parent, designated the "obligee"); accordingly, the children
spend relatively little time with their father (the non-custodial
parent, designated the "obligor"). 91 In addition, it is assumed
that the non-custodial parent incurs no fixed costs associated
with the children and that there are no additional costs for
child care and education or other extraordinary expenses. All
90 Spreadsheets containing the calculations of the child support obligations
across these income point permutations for each of the prevailing
guidelines and the Cost Shares model are on file with the author.
91 Although it is assumed the children spend almost one hundred percent of'
their time with their mother, this does not necessarily require the father to
not spend any time with them, only that they are treated as living
exclusively with their mother under the guidelines (and, thus, the father is
treated as not incurring any expenses associated with the children); this
assumption is likely to be more accurate in the situation of obligor non-
payment that will be explored later than in other divorce situations.
Accordingly, "obligee" refers to the mother and "obligor" refers to the
father.
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figures used in the calculations reflect 2006 dollars, either as
reported in 200692 or translated into 2006 dollars based on the
Consumer Price Index.
93
As some of the guidelines calculate child support
obligations based on net income, the seventy hypothetical
gross income points per parent are translated to net income
based on 2006 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax rules.94 In
92 For example, poverty levels are taken from the United States Department
of Health and Human Services website, which are updated every year. See
2006 Federal Poverty Guidelines,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
93 For example, most states that have adopted the Income Shares model
calculate a basic child support obligation based on a 1986 study of what
intact households spent in dollars on-children. Courts in these states use
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to update the 1986 dollars. See Robert G.
Williams, supra note 14, at 291 - 95. The Bureau of Labor Statistic's CPI
Inflation Calculator is used to translate older dollars to 2006 dollars. See
CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008).
94 Of relevance, a standard deduction of $5,150 is taken for the non-
custodial parent as he is assumed to be single, and a standard deduction of
$7,550 is taken for the custodial parent as she is assumed to be the head of
a household. See Publication 501: Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and
Filing Information For Use In Preparing 2006 Returns 22 (2006),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008). An
exemption of $3,300 is taken for the non-custodial parent who has one
person in his household, and an exemption of $9,900 is taken for the
custodial parent who has three people in her household. See id. at 8 - 9.
An earned income credit is given to the custodial parent when her adjusted
gross income is under $36,348 as she is assumed to be the head of a
household. See Publication 596: Earned Income Credit (EIC) For Use In
Preparing 2006 Returns (2006), http://www.irsgov/pub/irs-pdf/p596.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008). A child tax credit of $2,000 ($1,000 per child)
is given to the custodial parent; the child tax credit is reduced by $50 for
each $1,000 by which the custodial parent's modified adjusted gross
income exceeds $75,000. See Publication 972: Child Tax Credit For Use
In Preparing 2006 Returns (2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p972.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008). Social security tax of 6.2% is withheld on the
first $94,200 of gross income for both parents. See Publication 15-A:
Employer's Supplemental Tax Guide 36 (2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl5a.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
Medicare tax of 1.45% is withheld on all gross income for both parents.
See id. Finally, the federal income tax calculation is based on the 2006
Federal Tax Rate Schedule. See 2006 Federal Tax Rate Schedule,
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order to translate gross income to net income, state income
taxes also must be withheld. It is assumed Georgia state taxes
are withheld under all the guidelines, 95 except under 'the
Delaware Melson Formula because the Formula specifies that
child support must be calculated based on the withholding of
Delaware state taxes even if the parents do not live in
Delaware. 96 Georgia is chosen because until July 1, 2006, its
guidelines were a flat percentage version of the percentage of
income standard,97 and also because its guidelines have been
used to calculate hypothetical child support obligations under
the percentage of income standard in prior literature.
98
Child support obligations under the percentage of
income standard are calculated according to Georgia's prior
model (a flat percentage version of the percentage of income
http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/article/0,,id=150856,00.html (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008).
95 Of relevance, a standard deduction of $2,300 is taken for both the
custodial and non-custodial parent. See State of Georgia Department of
Revenue 2006 Individual Income Tax 500 and 500EZ Forms and General
Instructions 8 (2006),
http://www.etax.dor.ga.gov/inctax/2006_forms/TSDIndividualIncome_T
ax_500_and_500EZForms andGeneral_InstructionsIT511 .pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008). A personal exemption of $2,700 is taken for both
the custodial and non-custodial parent, and the custodial parent receives an
extra $3,000 exemption for each child, for a total exemption of $8,700.
See id. Finally, the Georgia state income tax calculation is based on the
Georgia Tax Rate Schedule. See id. at 17 - 19.
96 See The Family Court of the State of Delaware: Delaware Child Support
Formula Evaluation and Update, supra note 68. Of relevance, a standard
deduction of $3,250 is taken for both the custodial and non-custodial
parent. See 2006 Delaware Resident Income Tax Return 6 (2006),
http://revenue.delaware.gov/services/Developer/2006/ia/personal/TY06_R
esBooklet-i2.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). The Delaware state income
tax calculation is based on the 2006 Delaware State Income Tax Table.
See id. at 23 - 25. Finally, Delaware provides an earned income credit of
20% of the federal earned income credit. See id. at 1. This amount is
subtracted from the state income taxes due.
97 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-15 (1998) with GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-
15 (2007). See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
98 See Rogers, supra note 14; Rogers & Bieniewicz, supra note 59.
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standard based solely on obligor gross income).99 Similar to
prior literature, the median percentage applied to gross income
to calculate child support obligations for two children is used
to calculate obligations.l°°
Child support obligations under the Income Shares
model are calculated according to the original Income Shares
model developed by the Institute for Court Management of the
National Center for State Courts. 10  The economics
underlying the model have been adopted with little adjustment
by most of the states using the Income Shares model. 102 The
obligations are calculated based on parents' gross income
according to the tables included in an article written by Dr.
Robert Williams, director of the Child Support Guidelines
Project, who helped devise the Incomes Shares model. 10 3
These tables reflect estimates of child-rearing expenses
derived from Espenshade's study. 10 4  Although many states
subsequently updated their child support schedules with more
current estimates of child-rearing expenses,10 5 as noted, the
differences between the new tables and the tables based on
Espenshade's analysis are marginal.1
0 6
Child support obligations under the Delaware Melson
Formula are calculated based on the steps outlined in the
Delaware Child Support Formula Evaluation and Update from
99 See Rogers, supra note 14, at 137 ("Georgia uses percent-of-income
guidelines based on the obligor's gross income multiplied by a percentage
based on the number of children for whom support is being determined.").
100 The percentage range of obligor gross income for two children is 23
percent to 28 percent. See id. Accordingly, 25.5 percent is applied to each
obligor gross income point to determine child support orders.
'0 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
102 See Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 12 ("All but a handful of
Income Shares states adopted the prototype Income Shares model
developed by the Advisory Panel staff, or a modified version of the
prototype.").
103 Williams, supra note 14, at 292 - 93. As these tables are in 1986
dollars, the CPI inflation calculator is used to update the figures to 2006
dollars. See supra note 93.
'04 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
105 See Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 14.
106 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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October 2, 2006.107 Finally, child support obligations under
the Cost Shares model are calculated according to the steps
outlined in a 2002 paper by the developers of the Cost Shares
model that includes tables for total expenditures on children in
single-parent households upon which the Cost Shares model is
based. 08
B. Comparisons and Analysis
This sub-part graphically compares and analyzes the
three prevailing guidelines and the Cost Shares model at a
selection of obligee (custodial mother) income points to
demonstrate how child support obligations yielded by each of
the guidelines converge and diverge at different obligor (non-
custodial father) income points. Of the seventy -possible
obligee income points, five are selected: $1,900, $2,500,
$3,000, $4,500, and $8,000. These income points are selected
to provide a diverse range of hypothetical custodial mothers
receiving child support so that the divergence in child support
obligations under the guidelines can be assessed for lower-
income, middle-income, and higher-income obligors, with an
emphasis on lower-income obligors. The graphs each present
the range of obligor income points that best illustrates where
the guidelines converge and diverge-that is, at what income
levels non-custodial fathers pay different or similar amounts
under the guidelines, assuming the custodial mother's income
is held steady.
107 See The Family Court of the State of Delaware: Delaware Child
Support Formula Evaluation and Update, supra note 60. For the child
support order calculation steps and Delaware's assumptions, see supra Part
II.C. For a more detailed explanation of the calculation, see Venohr and
Williams, supra note 23, at 16, and Charles T. Berry, West Virginia Child
Support Guidelines: The Melson Formula, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 809, 815
(1995) (outlining a five-step process for applying the Melson Formula).
108 See Rogers & Bieniewicz, supra note 59, at 13 - 22.
109 $1,900 is chosen as the lowest obligee income point because it is just
above the approximately $1,840 poverty threshold for a three person
household in 2006. 2006 Federal Poverty Guidelines, supra note 92.
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1. Lower-Income Obligees: Obligee Incomes
of $1,900 and $2,500
Figure 1: Child Support Obligations - Obligee Monthly Gross Income of $1,900
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Figure 2: Child Support Obligations - Obligee Monthly Gross Income of $1,900,
Higher Obtigor Income
1,300
5 1,200
1,100
0
1, 000
.o
8 00
600
Obligor Monthly Gross Income (In dollars)
[-Percentage of Income Standard -lIncoe Shares Model &'Delaara Mlson Fonula -Cot Shares Mod
Winter 2009 Child Support and In(ability) to Pay
Figure 3: Child Support Obligations - Obligee Monthly Gross Income of $2,500
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Figure 4: Child Support Obligations - Obligee Monthly Gross Income of $2,500,
Higher Obllgor Income
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Figures 1 and 2 present child support obligations to be
paid by the non-custodial father (obligor) when the custodial
mother's (obligee's) monthly gross income is $1,900, with
Figure 1 focusing on obligor income that is relatively low and
Figure 2 focusing on obligor income that is relatively high.
Similarly, Figures 3 and 4 present child support obligations to
be paid by the non-custodial father when the custodial
mother's income is $2,500, again with Figure 3 focusing on
obligor income that is relatively low and Figure 4 focusing on
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obligor income that is relatively high. These graphs, as do the
subsequent graphs, demonstrate that in balancing the interests
implicated in splitting one household into two, the guidelines
produce divergent, sometimes substantially divergent, child
support obligations.
Unsurprisingly, the percentage of income standard
yields higher child support obligations across all income
points except in the rare instance illustrated in Figure 1 in
which the obligee's monthly income is very low and the
obligor's monthly income is very low.'' 0 First, when the
obligor's monthly income is just above the poverty level, the
Income Shares model yields higher child support
obligations."1 I This result is consistent with the Income
Shares model's initial reliance on economic data regarding
what parents spend on children in intact households." 2 It is at
these very low income levels that the Income Shares model
requires parents to spend a substantial portion of their incomes
on their children, even more so than the strict percentage used
by the percentage of income standard. But, as evident by
comparing Figures 1 and 2, as the combined parents' income
increases (and the obligor's income rises and diverges), the
Income Shares model quickly yields increasingly lower child
support obligations, confirming that the Income Shares model
overall yields lower obligations than the percentage of income
standard, especially as the parents' income diverges.
113
Second, when the obligor's monthly income is slightly
above the poverty level, the Cost Shares model yields higher
child support obligations. This result is consistent with the
Cost Shares model's reliance on economic data concerning
"10 When the obligee's monthly gross income is $2,200, the Income Shares
model yields child support orders lower than the percentage of income
standard; when the obligee's monthly gross income is $2,100, the Cost
Shares model yields child support orders lower than the percentage of
income standard.
111 Approximately $1,090 is the poverty threshold for a single person
household in 2006. 2006 Federal Poverty Guidelines, supra note 92.
112 See supra notes 46 -49 and accompanying text.
113 See supra Part II.B. This result is also confirmed by subsequent
Figures.
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what parents spend on their children after household
dissolution and with its explicit inclusion of poverty
thresholds for both parents.' As the Cost Shares model does
not require parents to pay any child support until their income
is greater than 133 percent of the applicable poverty level,'
15
as evidenced by Figure 1, it is not until the obligor's income is
$1,100 per month that he is required to pay child support. At
that point, as evidenced by the steep upward order as obligor
income rises, the obligor is required to pay as much as he can
in order to meet the children's basic needs as determined by
data concerning what parents spend on children after
household dissolution. As evidenced by comparing Figures 1
and 2, once that basic need is met, the Cost Shares model
yields lower child support obligations. Further, as evidenced
in Figure 3, once the obligee's income is 133 percent above
the poverty level, the obligee is required to contribute what
she can in order to meet the children's basic needs, thereby
decreasing what the obligor parent is required to pay.
Similarly, the Melson Formula's initial assumption that
each parent should not pay any child support until his or her
basic needs are met causes the Melson Formula to yield lower
obligations when the parents' income is lower. When the
obligee's income is $1,000 or under, the obligee cannot afford
any child support based on the assumed poverty level.'
1 6
Conversely, when the obligor's income is above the poverty
line, the Melson Formula's assumption that each parent should
share marginal increases in his or her standard of living causes
the obligor's child support obligation to rise so that he can
share the increase in his standard of living with the children.
These results are evidenced most clearly in Figures 1 and 3.
Figures 2 and 4 illustrate the criticism of the Melson
Formula made in Part II.C: that although the Melson Formula
provides an allowance for basic needs, it is those obligors
whose income is toward the low end of "middle income" who
are required to pay substantial portions of their income.
114 See supra notes 80 and 81.
115 See Rogers & Bieniewicz, supra note 59, at 14, n. 16.
116 Supra note 68.
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Specifically, when the parent who is receiving child support
has very low income, the Melson Formula expects the higher
income-earning parent to pay a relatively high child support
obligation in order to equalize the standards of living across
the two households. However, this result is only true when the
higher income-earning parent is making relatively low
income, evidenced by the increasing divergence of child
support obligations under the Melson Formula as compared to
the Income Shares model at the tail-end of Figures 2 and 4.
Yet it is at these income levels that the obligor is least able to
pay such a high percentage of income. As noted (and rather
intuitively), lower-to-middle-income obligors cannot
realistically pay that high a percentage of their income, even
when they cut expenses to the bare minimum. 117 And as
explored in Part IV, these obligors will feel, and objectively
will be, unable to pay their entire obligations. In contrast, as
evidenced in Figures 2 and 4, and even in Figure 3, the Cost
Shares model requires obligors to pay a much lower
percentage of their income, which may be more realistic.
Further, Figures 2 and 4 confirm that the Melson
Formula yields child support obligations similar, although
lower, to those under the percentage of income standard and
Income Shares model when the parents' income is similar, but
produces less extreme standard of living differences between
the two resulting households when the parents' income is
divergent. 118 In particular, as the parents' incomes increase
and diverge, the Melson Formula's obligations move away
from those yielded by the Income Shares model.
Overall, Figures 1 - 4 demonstrate that the Cost Shares
model, even at relatively low levels of obligor income, yields
lower child support obligations. Though the Income Shares
model's more robust calculations may yield lower obligations
than the percentage of income standard, and the payment
characteristics of obligors presented in Part IV demonstrate
that the Melson Formula's even more robust calculations may
yield still lower obligations than the Income Shares model,
117 See supra notes 40 and 41, and accompanying text.
118 See supra Part II.C.
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those obligations still may not be low enough to allow lower-
income obligors to feel that they are able to pay their entire
obligations while maintaining an adequate standard of living,
even if that standard only meets their minimum needs."
9
2. Middle-Income Obligees: Obligee Income
of $3,000 and $4,500
Figure 5: Child Support Obligations - Obligee Monthly Gross Income of $3,000
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119 See supra notes 40 and 41, and accompanying text.
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Figure 5 presents child support obligations to be paid
by the non-custodial father (obligor) when the custodial
mother's (obligee's) monthly gross income is $3,000, and
Figure 6 presents child support obligations to be paid by the
non-custodial father when the custodial mother's monthly
gross income is $4,500. These Figures reconfirm that the
Income Shares model yields lower child support obligations as
compared to the percentage of income standard and that the
Melson Formula yields more divergent awards the more the
parents' income differ. They also begin to demonstrate how
much greater obligations under the percentage of income
standard are as compared to the still relatively high Income
Shares model. Further, these Figures show that the Cost
Shares model yields increasingly lower child support
obligations as obligee and obligor income increases, especially
as compared to the Income Shares model enacted in a majority
of states. Though the Cost Shares model may require obligors
to pay a similar amount of child support when both parents'
income is just above the poverty level, once one or both
parents make above the poverty level, even if that amount is
still considered lower-income, the obligor is required to pay an
obligation that is increasingly lower than that required under
current guidelines. 120
120 In a few instances, as illustrated by Figures 1, 3, and 5, the Cost Shares
model yields higher than or very similar obligations to the Melson
Formula.
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3. Higher-Income Obligees: Obligee Income
of $8,000
Figure 7: Child Support Obligations - Obligee Monthly Gross Income of $8,000
Obligor Monthly Gross Income (in dollars)
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Figures 7 and 8 present child support obligations to be
paid by the non-custodial father (obligor) when the custodial
mother's (obligee's) monthly gross income is $8,000, with
Figure 7 focusing on relatively low obligor income and Figure
8 focusing on relatively high obligor income. These Figures,
when compared to the previous Figures, illustrate that as the
obligee's monthly income increases, the obligor is required to
UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy
pay consistently less in. child support. They also further
demonstrate how much greater obligations under the
percentage of income standard are as compared to the still
relatively high Income Shares model. Finally, they
demonstrate how the Cost Shares model's reliance on
economic data regarding expenditures by parents on their
children after divorce translates to lower obligations,
especially when the custodial parents make middle-to-high
income.
C. Who Supports Which Guidelines And Which Guidelines
Should They Really Support
In addition to analyzing how the three prevailing
guidelines and the Cost Shares model balance the legitimate
interests inherent in the child support system, these
calculations can be used to evaluate which guidelines each
interested party impacted by the child support system
(custodial parents, non-custodial parents, and children) should
support. Custodial parents should favor guidelines that yield
the highest child support obligation, allowing them to provide
more for their children (and more for themselves as a
byproduct of living with the children). Taking only the
numerical obligation into account, among the three currently
enacted guidelines, custodial parents generally should be in
favor of the percentage of income standard or the Income
Shares model that bases its obligations on gross income.
121
Likewise, non-custodial parents should favor guidelines that
yield the lowest child support obligation, thereby paying less
child support to the custodial parent and preserving their
standard of living. Accordingly, taking only the numerical
obligation into account, non-custodial parents generally should
be in favor of the Income Shares model that is based on net
income or the Delaware Melson Formula.
Yet, a more nuanced analysis of the guidelines may
cause custodial and non-custodial parents to alter their
12 1 Though not demonstrated graphically, the gross income version of the
Income Shares model tends to yield slightly higher obligations than that
net income version of the Income Shares model. See supra Part II.B.
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evaluation of which guidelines are more favorable to them.
For example, the non-custodial parent may want to pay the
custodial parent more in child support in order to provide his
or her children with a better standard of living in the house
where they spend most of their time, regardless of how an
increased payment would benefit the custodial parent.
Similarly, the custodial parent may want to ensure that the
non-custodial parent does not pay so much child support that
his or her standard of living decreases so drastically that the
children are faced with an impoverished parent when they visit
their non-custodial parent.
122
These observations can be applied to analyze which
guidelines children, through child advocates, should favor.
Under the assumptions of this article, again taking only the
numerical obligation into account, child advocates generally
should favor the same guidelines as custodial parents because
the children's standard of living will be improved by the
higher child support payments that custodial parents desire.
Again adopting a more nuanced approach, child advocates
also may be attracted to guidelines that better ensure that
custodial parents will receive payment from obligors,
guidelines that provide higher payments to lower-income
custodial parents, or guidelines that split the necessary
decrease in standard of living between the two resulting
households so that the children's parents will both live
similarly.
If child advocates are concerned about lower-income
parents receiving higher payments, they may be more likely to
favor the Melson Formula. Similarly, if child advocates are
concerned about both parents having a minimum standard of
living, they should prefer the Melson Formula, which does not
impoverish lower-income obligors as greatly as the other
guidelines and requires higher-income parents to pay more
money to lower-income parents even if the lower-income
122 "To privilege children's needs over their parents', we are forced to
privilege the custodial parent over the absent parent. To privilege the
claim of the wage earner on earnings, we weaken children's claim on their
parents' aid, and put the provider of income ahead of the provider of care."
Betson, supra note 3, at 19.
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parent is the non-custodial parent. However, because the
Melson Formula still yields relatively high orders for low-to-
middle-income (though not very low income) obligors, 123
child advocates that are concerned about custodial parents
receiving payment from obligors may be reluctant to favor it.
Further, as with the percentage of income standard and the
Income Shares model, the Melson Formula yields high
absolute obligations when obligor income is middle-to-high. 124
Obligors faced with such a high child support order, even if it
is proportionately small relative to their total income, may
refuse to pay the order on the principle that it is too high and
unfairly elevates the standard of living of the custodial parent
or for some other reason.
The Cost Shares model remedies these defects: it
yields lower child support obligations at almost every income
level as compared to all three prevailing guidelines. Hence,
the Cost Shares model can be viewed as guarding against
obligor non-payment, both voluntary non-payment and non-
payment because of financial constraints,1 25 while still
addressing concerns about each parent maintaining a
minimum standard of living.
The next part of this article explores why some
obligors do not pay their child support obligations and what
causes parents and judges to deviate from the guidelines to
provide evidence that supports the contention that the Cost
Shares model is a better alternative to currently enacted child
support guidelines.
123 Supra Figures 2 and 4.
124 Supra Figures 5 - 8.
125 These financial constraints may be better termed "perceived financial
constraints," because, as will be discussed in Part IV.A, most currently
enacted guidelines treat lower-income obligors differently to ensure that
they have enough money after their child support orders have been paid in
order to meet their basic needs. However, the guidelines set the amount of
income necessary to meet basic needs at the poverty line. Infra Part IV.A.
This income level may not be enough for the obligor to meet his or her
basic needs for a variety of reasons, causing the obligor not to pay the child
support order because of financial constraints. Supra notes 40, 41.
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IV. Obligor Payment and Judicial Deviation
Characteristics
Nationally $105.4 billion was owed in past-due child
support in 2006, an increase from the $96 billion owed in
1262003. This part first discusses the treatment of lower-
income and higher-income obligors under currently enacted
child support guidelines. It then presents evidence concerning
when and why some obligors do not pay their child support
obligations, and when and why some parents and judges
deviate upwards from the presumptive child support obligation
yielded by the guidelines.
A. Current Treatment of Lower-Income Obligors
According to a 2003 study, non-custodial parents that
earn $10,000 or less (in 2003) owe approximately 70% of
past-due child support. 12 Other studies have "found that child
support awards are set above what poor nonresidential parents
can reasonably pay and sometimes exceed the nonresidential
parent's income. States have incorporated the findings of
these studies and other evidence into their guidelines by
treating lower-income parents differently. 129 The majority of
states have written a self-support reserve for non-custodial
parents into their guidelines. 130  For example, Minnesota,
which uses the percentage of income standard, applies a lower
126 Soreson, et al., Assessing Child Support Arrears in Nine Large States
and the Nation, 1 (2007), http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/assessing-CS-
debt/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008); Jane C. Venohr & Tracy E.
Griffith, Child Support Guidelines: Issues and Reviews, 43 FAM. CT. REV.
415, 425 (2005).
127 Venohr & Griffith, supra note 126, at 425.
128 id.
129 As of 2005, 39 states "includ[ed] an adjustment for nonresidential
parents with near poverty income." Id.
130 As of 2005, 28 states provided a self-support reserve. Id. "The self-
support reserve ensures that the nonresidential parent's income after
payment of child support is sufficient to at least provide a subsistence level
of living. Typically, if the self-support reserve is applied, the support
award is based on the difference between the nonresidential parent's net
income and the self-support reserve." Id.
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percentage to lower-income obligors.' 31 Similarly, some
states using the Income Shares model do not require lower-
income obligors to pay more than a minimal amount of
support unless the obligor's income is above the poverty
level.132
However, when both obligee and obligor have low
incomes, providing an adjustment for lower-income obligors
presents a difficult decision between adopting guidelines that
yield an obligation low enough that the lower-income obligor
will be able to pay, and adopting guidelines that yield a high
enough obligation that lower-income obligees will be able to
support their children.' 33 In these situations, some guidelines
effectively provide higher self-support reserves for non-
custodial parents through lower allocation of remaining
income to child support, while others allocate any extra
income after meeting the poverty threshold to child support.'
34
The evidence discussed below in subpart C concerning the
payment characteristics of lower-income obligors suggests
that perhaps this decision should be made in favor of adopting
guidelines that yield lower child support obligations so that
lower-income obligors will be able to pay their entire
obligation instead of not paying any of their obligation (in
contrast to paying the proportion of their obligation they can
afford) when faced with an entire obligation they are unable to
afford.
B. Current Treatment of Higher-Income Obligors
When the guidelines were first enacted, many states
limited the range of their guidelines, thereby excluding higher-
income households. Though the success of the guidelines has
prompted states to extend the range of their guidelines, states
wishing to amend their guidelines to include higher-income
households remain constrained by the economic estimates of
131 Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 33.
132 Id. at 33 - 34. ,
133 Id. at 34 ("In some situations, there is simply not enough income to
adequately provide for the obligor, obligee, and the children.").
134 For instance, compare the Income Shares model to the Delaware
Melson Formula.
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intact household expenditures on children that are unreliable
when the parents' combined income is over $180,000. 135
States have responded to this constraint in two main ways:
first, "[i]n some instances states have adopted child support
guidelines that do not have a maximum or cap on the income
to which they apply but rather call for a fixed percentage of
parental income to be allocated to child support no matter how
high that income may be"; and, second, "[m]ore commonly,
states have adopted child support guidelines that contain
brackets applicable to combined parental income figures up to
a maximum monthly amount."1 36 A small minority of states
require that higher-income cases be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 1
37
In states that have adopted the first solution, higher-
income cases usually prompt judges to consider the
"appropriateness of deviation from the statutory
guidelines. ' 38 In states that have adopted the second solution,
judges either assume that the obligation set by the guidelines
is correct and require the parent to rebut this presumption by
demonstrating that the obligation is inadequate or excessive,
or entirely disregard the guidelines' obligation and analyze the
children's needs and the parent's ability to pay on a case-by-
case basis.' 
39
There are a number of arguments against applying a
mechanical child support obligation calculation to higher-
income individuals which lead judges to deviate from the
guidelines in these cases. It is asserted that "[e]xcessively
high child support awards run afoul of case law, which
requires that support (1) not effectuate the distribution of the
135 Venohr & Williams, supra note 23, at 34.
136 Hogan, supra note 11, at 350.
137 Graves, supra note 2, at 298. "States ... that make case-by-case
determinations often specify the highest guideline amount as a presumptive
floor." Id.
138 Hogan, supra note 11, at 350. "For example, it is certainly debatable
whether an automatic award of eleven percent of the parent's gross
monthly income would be appropriate regardless of whether that income
figure was $10,000 or $100,000." Id.
139 Id. at 350 - 51.
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obligor's estate, (2) not provide an inappropriate windfall for
the child, and (3) not preclude a parent's right to direct a
child's lifestyle." 14 0 Also, it is argued that a mechanical
calculation does not accurately reflect the degree to which
parental income spent on their children declines as their
income increases. These criticisms, combined with
guidelines whose ranges may not extend to higher-income
cases, prompt parents and judges to deviate from the
guidelines in many higher-income cases, 142 a result that is
informative and important when choosing guidelines,
especially guidelines that yield lower child support
obligations.
C. Obligor Payment Characteristics
Identifying the payment and non-payment
characteristics of obligors is crucial to understanding whether
guidelines actually will be effective in providing custodial
parents with the child support they need to take care of their
children. Research has shown that characteristics of
noncustodial parents (and, thus, mainly obligors, and mostly
fathers 143) are more important to understanding and predicting
child support obligation payment than resident parents'
characteristics. 144 Non-paying obligors do'not pay their child
support obligations for a number of reasons that fall into two
broad categories: they do not have the financial resources to
pay, or they do not want to and do not intend to pay despite
having the financial capacity to do so. 145 Obligors that do not
pay despite having the financial capacity to do so are truly
"deadbeat dads," whereas obligors that do not pay because
140 Graves, supra note 2, at 298.
141 Hogan, supra note'l 1, at 351.
142 See supra notes 10 - 12 and accompanying text.
143 Smock & Manning, supra note 6 at 807.
144 Id. (noting that "to understand the determinants of child support,
information on the nonresident parent is crucial").
145 Venohr & Williams, supra note 7.
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they do not have the financial resources to do so are better
termed "turnips." 1
46
1. Deadbeat Dads
Though studies demonstrate that fathers with higher
income and more education are more likely overall to pay
their child support obligations, indicating that one determinant
of paying child support is the ability to do SO,147 there are still
a significant minority of fathers who refuse to fulfill their
child support obligations despite having the financial capacity
to do so. A 2001 study found that 42 percent of noncustodial
fathers do not pay their child support obligations despite
having "no apparent financial reason to shirk this
responsibility."' 148 Similarly, a 1998 study found that between
34 and 41 percent of noncustodial fathers are able non-
payers. 149
What makes these fathers choose not to pay? In
addition to higher income and more education, research
indicates that fathers are more likely to pay child support to
146 The term "turnip" is adapted from Ronald B. Mincey & Elain J.
Sorensen, Deadbeats and Turnips in Child Support Reform, 17 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 44 (1998) (noting that the term "turnip" comes from
the common saying that "you can't get blood from a turnip").
147 See Todd K. Shackelford, et. al., An Evolutionary Perspective On Why
Some Men Refuse Or Reduce Their Child Support Payments, 27 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 297, 298 (2005); Judi Bartfeld & Daniel R. Meyer,
Child Support Compliance Among Discretionary And Nondiscretionary
Obligors, 77 SOC. SERV. REv. 347, 349 (2003) ("Ability to pay is strongly
linked to compliance in the empirical literature."). Studies have linked
ability to pay with compliance for over a decade. For example, a 1996
study found that "[c]ompliance is higher among cases with greater ability
to pay. Compliance increases dramatically with income, although it does
fall somewhat for the highest income payers .... Compliance also varies
with the relative burden of support orders." Daniel R. Meyer & Judi
Bartfeld, Compliance with Child Support Orders In Divorce Cases, 58 J.
OF MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 201,205 (1996).
148 Elaine Sorensen & Chava Zibman, Getting to Know Poor Fathers Who
Do Not Pay Child Support, 75 SOC. SERV. REv. 421, 422 (2001). This is
the most recent estimate of noncustodial fathers. Marcia Cancian & Daniel
R. Meyer, Fathers of Children Receiving Welfare: Can They Provide More
Child Support?, SOC. SERV. REV. 179, 201 (2004).
149 Mincey & Sorensen, supra note 146, at 47.
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women to whom they previously had been married or with
whom they have maintained an amicable relationship, and if
they live close to or visit frequently with their children.' 50 In
contrast, fathers are less likely to pay when they feel their
child support obligations are numerically unfair' and, more
qualitatively, when they feel they do not know how their
money is being spent, such as when the custodial mother
denies them access to their children or they merely have
limited access to their children. 152 They also may not pay in
order to spite the custodial mother with whom they have a
contentious relationship, even if in doing so they harm their
children. 
53
Further, particularly in the case of a lower-income
father who has the financial ability to fulfill his obligation but
nevertheless chooses not to do so, if the custodial parent
receiving the money to be spent on the children also receives
welfare, in an attempt to recoup welfare expenditures, the
federal government forces the custodial parent to assign her
150 Shackelford, supra note 147, at 298 - 99. See also Lenna
Nepomnyaschy, Child Support and Father-Child Contact: Testing
Reciprocal Pathways, 44 DEMOGRAPHY 93 (2007) (discussing the
relationship between noncustodial fathers' payment of child support
obligations and contact with their children); Henry, supra note 7, at 264
(asserting that "the obligor's access to the child" is one of the three most
important predictors of compliance with child support obligations).
151 See I-Fen Lin, Perceived Fairness and Compliance with Child Support
Obligations, 62 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 388 (2000) (finding that
perceived fairness of child support obligations increases father's
compliance and that perceived fairness can be increased by decreasing
child support obligations); Henry, supra note 7, at 264 (asserting that "the
fairness of the order" is one of the three most important predictors of
compliance with child support obligations); Daniel R. Meyer, Fathers and
the Child Support System, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 88, 93
(J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli, eds., 2000) (noting that "when
fathers have discretion about whether they will pay ... those who think
their orders are fair pay more support").
152 Henry, supra note 7; Shackelford, supra note 147, at 301.
153 Shackelford, supra note 147, at 302 - 03. See generally Solangel
Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced
Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 921 (2005).
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award to the federal government. 154  When faced with
effectively paying their child support obligations to the federal
government, non-custodial parents may refuse to pay those
obligations for a variety of reasons. Non-custodial parents
may refuse to pay because they cannot trace how their money
is being spent. They also may refuse to pay because they
anticipate that custodial parents will unfairly use money meant
for the children on themselves as the welfare payments they
receive combine money that is meant to support both the
parents and the children and money that is meant to support
solely the children, making it difficult to separate what portion
of the payments should be spent on whom. Additionally,
under these circumstances and in other situations in which
obligors fear that money meant for their children will be spent
by custodial parents on themselves, obligors may choose to
provide in-kind transfer-such as buying food, clothing, and
other necessities for the children-rather than make a
monetary payment, thereby providing for their children, but
technically not fulfilling their child support obligations.
155
Although there is no research regarding what portion
of fathers do not pay their child support obligations because of
these more qualitative concerns, it can be assumed that fathers
who choose not to pay are more likely to do so because of
factors that cannot be remedied by lowering numerical child
support obligations. As noted, fathers who are more educated
and earn higher incomes are more likely to pay their child
support obligations. Part of the reason why these fathers are
more likely to pay undoubtedly stems from their ability to pay,
but part of the reason likely comes from an understanding that
monetary support is important for their children's well-being
and development. 56 Even if many of these fathers feel that
154 Ronald K. Henry, Child Support Policy and the Unintended
Consequences of Good Intentions, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD
SUPPORT PAYMENTS 128, 128 (William S. Comanor, ed., 2004).
155 Robert J. Willis, Child Support and the Problem of Economic
Incentives, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
31, 47 (William S. Comanor, ed., 2004) ("[A] non-custodial father will
always prefer to make in-kind transfers to the child instead of giving
fungible transfers to the mother in order to avoid leakages .....
156 Shackelford, supra note 147, at 298 - 99.
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their child support obligations are numerically unfair, it is
likely that these educated fathers will pay the obligation
despite their stance on its fairness.
In addition, higher income fathers are more likely to
have steady salaries, making wage garnishment a more
powerful threat, both in that garnishment likely would be
successful, and in that such an action carries a stigma higher
income individuals may be anxious to avoid. 157  Also, as
shown by census data, higher income women and men tend to
marry each other, and, thus, upon divorce, tend to collect child
support from each other.' 58 Higher income custodial parents
may have better resources, more time, and more motivation to
enforce child support orders-such as hiring lawyers or
alerting child support enforcement offices to non-payment
(and then following up with them)-thereby increasing the
incentives for non-custodial parents to pay their obligations in
order to avoid such measures. Therefore, most fathers who
choose not to pay their obligations withhold support based on
qualitative concerns child support guidelines almost certainly
cannot address.
2. Turnips
As of 2001, there were 2.5 million noncustodial fathers
(26 percent of all noncustodial fathers) whose financial
resources were so limited that they had little, and in many
cases, no ability to pay their child support obligations.
59
Research finds that whereas nearly all noncustodial fathers
who did pay child support had incomes above the poverty
15' Wage garnishment is one method by which payment of child support
obligations can be forced. Other methods include moving for license
revocation, attaching tax refunds, placing a lien on property, and filing a
contempt motion. Collecting Past Due Child Support, Lawyers.com,
http://family-law.lawyers.com/child-support/Collecting-Past-Due-Child-
Support.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
158 See United States Census. Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2008).
159 Sorensen & Zibman, supra note 148, at 430. See also Bartfeld and
Meyer, supra note 147, at 349 (noting the "importance of the burden of the
support order," defined as "the amount owed in support, relative to actual
income" in assessing ability to pay).
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level, only three percent of nonresident fathers with income
below the poverty level paid child support.' Similarly, a
1998 study found that between 16 and 33 percent of young
noncustodial fathers cannot afford to pay their child support
obligations, and a 1997 study found that at least 15 percent
and as many as 25 percent of noncustodial fathers qualify as
poor. 1
61
Further, as of 2001, there were at least one million
noncustodial fathers who qualified as poor who nevertheless
still paid their child support obligations, evidencing that many
other poor noncustodial fathers likely would pay their
obligation if they were financially able to do so.' 6 2 Thus, as of
2001, there were over 3.5 million noncustodial fathers
(approximately 36 percent of all noncustodial fathers) who
had very low incomes.' 63 Studies find that compliance rates
increase as noncustodial fathers' income increases further
evidencing that the relative burden of the child support
obligation is important in assessing whether a lower-income
father will be able financially to pay his obligation.' 64
Fathers may be too poor to afford their entire child
support obligations for an amalgam of reasons. Research has
estimated that 60 percent of lower-income fathers are of a
racial or ethnic minority, that only two percent of lower-
income fathers have a college degree, that 42 percent of lower-
160 Sorensen & Zibman, supra note 148, at 422 -23.
161 Mincey & Sorensen, supra note 146, at 47; Elaine Sorensen, A National
Profile of Nonresident Fathers and Their Ability to Pay Child Support, 59
J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 785, 791 (2007) (noting that these
estimates are "considerably higher than the poverty rate among self-
reporting nonresident fathers").
162 Elaine Sorensen & Helen Oliver, Policy Reforms Are Needed to
Increase Child Support From Poor Fathers, 2 (2002), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410477.pdf (noting that "[o]ne quarter
of these 'fathers are paying more than 50 percent of their gross income in
child support" and that "among non-poor fathers, only 2 percent pay [that]
much").
163 Id. at 4.
164 Meyer and Bartfeld, supra note 147, at 211 (noting that results of their
study "suggest that guidelines that require more than 30% of the father's
income may involve a trade-off in the form of lower compliance").
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income fathers do not have a high school diploma, and that
lower-income fathers' employment status changes often,
causing them to work much less than full-time on a per annum
basis. 15  These characteristics make it difficult for lower-
income fathers to find stable work with a salary adequate to
lift them out of poverty, with lack of education, lack of work
experience, and poor health proving to be the largest
obstacles. 166  Without stable employment, lower-income
fathers have trouble maintaining regular child support
payments because of their fluctuating weekly and monthly
income. 167 These findings have prompted commentators to
urge for the implementation of programs designed to provide
lower-income fathers with greater access to employment-
related services and work-support systems.'
68
In addition, evidence shows that lack of stable formal
employment not only decreases lower-income fathers'
financial ability to pay their child support obligations, but also
that being removed from the child support payment
enforcement system associated with formal employment
causes these lower-income fathers to not pay their obligations
165 Sorensen and Zibman, supra note 148, at 423 - 24; Sorensen and
Oliver, supra note 160, at 5 - 7.
166 Sorensen and Zibman, supra note 148, at 425; Mincey & Sorensen,
supra note 146, at 48 ("[Turnips] are younger, less educated, more likely to
be African American, and more likely to have less work experience.");
Henry, supra note 7, at 264 (asserting that "the obligor's work stability" is
one of the three most important predictors of compliance with child
support obligations).
161Maureen R. Waller & Robert Plotnick, Effective Child Support Policy
for Low-Income Families: Evidence from Street Level Research, 20 J. OF
POL'Y ANALYSIs AND MGMT. 89, 103 (2001) ("[Lower-income] fathers
have problems with paying regular support when they have irregular
employment. Because their jobs [are] often part-time, temporary, or low-
paying, they find it hard to make child support payments and meet their
own basic expenses at the same time.").
168 Sorensen and Zibman, supra note 148, at 430 - 31; Cancian & Meyer,
supra note 148, at 202 ("Only by increasing nonresident fathers' earning
capacity can child support serve to substantially decrease the poverty of
resident mothers and their children without increasing it among
nonresident fathers."); Shackelford, supra note 147, at 304 ("We suspect
that job training that leads to better jobs or perhaps to any job will increase
the reliability with which child support is paid by noncustodial fathers.").
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based on some of the individual qualitative payment
preference factors associated with able non-payers. 69 For
example, a lower-income father who has the financial capacity
to pay a portion of his obligation may decide not to pay any of
it without prompting from the enforcement system associated
with stable formal employment, such as the routine
withholding of child support from the obligor's income and
the requirement that employers report new hires to a central
database. 170
Also, a sizable majority of nonpaying fathers owe
substantial amounts of child support in arrearages. There is
evidence that when faced with such daunting amounts they are
unlikely to be able to pay off, even if they have enough
income to pay their monthly child support obligations, lower-
income fathers tend to not pay either their monthly or
arrearage obligations. 171  Commentators have suggested
establishing "arrearage amnesty programs" to encourage these
fathers to pay their obligations as they become financially able
to do so, thereby ensuring that lower-income fathers that can
afford to pay and want to pay their obligations are not
discouraged by unrealistic arrearage obligations.'
72
Beyond hypothesizing about what steps can be taken to
improve the financial capacity of lower-income fathers and
how such efforts may decrease the percentage of lower-
income fathers financially unable to pay their current child
support obligations, the results of these studies also lead
commentators to call for modifications to child support
guidelines so that resulting child support obligations are more
reflective of lower-income fathers' economic
169 Bartfeld & Meyer, supra note 147, at 364 - 65.
Id. at 349.
171 Id. at 365.
172 Id. See also Sorensen & Oliver, supra note 162, at 14 (noting that
current arrearage policies "result in large arrears that poor fathers cannot
pay"); Waller & Plotnick, supra note 167, at 104 ("Fathers who feel
intimidated or overwhelmed by child support enforcement may ignore
child support orders and accumulate substantial arrearages.").
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circumstances. 173 Similarly, fathers' rights groups have cited
this and other research in maintaining that current child
support guidelines leave lower-income fathers in "an
economically untenable position." 174  Fathers' rights groups
contend that lower-income fathers often have difficulty
financially taking care of themselves, let alone financially
providing for their children, a situation that most current child
support guidelines fail to appreciate. 
175
The observation that lower-income fathers spend what
money they have on their immediate needs is bolstered by
research concerning the bankruptcy rates and characteristics of
middle-class families. Even post-divorce middle-income
fathers find it difficult to pay for rent, other necessities, and
incidental unforeseen costs, and still have enough money to
meet their child support obligations. 177 These are fathers who
feel terrible about potentially shirking their obligations, so
terrible that bankruptcy and its stigma appear to be the best
option. 178 If middle-income fathers, many with ex-wives who
are earning a similar income, are in such a "financial
maelstrom"'179 that they are turning to bankruptcy, it is logical
that lower-income fathers, especially those with ex-spouses
with income just above the poverty level, and thus higher child
support obligations, also have difficulty meeting their entire
obligations despite their best intentions. Moreover, middle-
income fathers are not the target of the work-support and
"arrearage amnesty" programs that commentators advocate,
173 See Mincey & Sorensen, supra note 146, at 48; Sorensen & Oliver,
supra note 162, at 13.
174CROWLEY, supra note 9, at 163.175 Id. at 163, 189.
176 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 40, at 97 - 122.
177 Id. at 120 ("We estimate that more than 160,000 with child support and
alimony obligations will end up in bankruptcy in [2003] alone . . .
[making] fathers who owe child support more than three times more likely
to file for bankruptcy than single men who don't owe support.").
178 Bankruptcy does not allow these fathers to get out of paying their child
support obligations. All child support (and alimony) obligations come
through bankruptcy 100 percent "intact." Rather, bankruptcy discharges
most other debt, such as credit card debt, that fathers have been building up
in order to meet their child support obligations every month. Id.
179 Id.
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yet they have trouble meeting their obligations too.
"Arrearage amnesty" programs certainly may help lower-
income fathers, who are perhaps the most likely to forgo
paying their entire obligations even if they can pay a
portion. However, the fact that middle-income fathers also
are having a difficult time meeting their obligations may
further indicate that current child support guidelines do not
reflect economic reality and that the increased payment of
child support cannot be induced solely through programs such
as work support and "arrearage amnesty."
Indeed, research shows that lower-income fathers
"tend to have the actual means to pay small support awards on
a consistent basis." ' 81 For example, one study found that on
average noncustodial fathers "are able to pay nearly five times
more in child support than they currently pay," but that this
"ability to pay differs substantially by the race, marital status,
and poverty status of the custodial mother."'' 82 Another study
found that lower absolute child support obligations result -in
higher compliance among lower-income noncustodial
fathers. 183
Lower-income fathers' ability to pay some, but not all,
of their obligations becomes important when evaluating the
various child support guidelines. As evidenced by the graphs
in Part HI.B, current guidelines yield higher obligations for the
noncustodial parent across the income spectrum when the
180 As middle-income fathers are turning to bankruptcy, which does not
discharge their child support obligations, it can be assumed that they are
more likely to pay as much of their obligations as possible. This
assumption is consistent with the observations in Part IV.C.1 concerning
payment characteristics of fathers with higher education and more stable
incomes.
181 CROWLEY, supra note 9, at 165.
182 Cynthia Miller, et al., Child.Support in the U.S.: Can Fathers Afford To
Pay More?, 43 REv. OF INC. & WEALTH 261, 278 - 79 (1997); Sorensen,
supra note 161 (finding that on average noncustodial fathers can increase
their child support payments).
183 CROWLEY, supra note 9, at 165; Judi Bartfeld & Daniel R. Meyer, Are
There Really Deadbeat Dads?: The Relationship Between Ability to Pay,
Enforcement, and Compliance in Nonmarital Child Support Cases, 68
SOC. SERV. REv. 219 (1994).
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custodial parent has lower income. Yet it is when the
noncustodial parent has low income that he is least able to pay
a high percentage of his income in child support. Child
support guidelines that yield lower obligations may allow a
portion of lower-income fathers to be able financially to pay
their child support obligations. Accordingly, based on the
evidence regarding the payment characteristics of lower-
income fathers, unlike true deadbeat dads, child support
guidelines have the potential to decrease the percentage of
lower-income fathers who do not pay their child support
obligations, thereby increasing the aggregate amount of child
support paid, especially the aggregate amount paid to children
from lower-income households.
D. Deviation Characteristics
In addition to focusing on obligor payment
characteristics, research also has explored when and why
parents and judges deviate from the presumptive obligation
yielded by child support guidelines. Evidence spanning a
decade shows that some divorcing and divorced parents
deviate upward from or otherwise modify the presumptive
obligations yielded by the guidelines in an effort to better
reflect the costs of continuing to raise their children at their
current standard of living and to better replicate how they
provided for their children pre-divorce. For example, a 2003
study which explored what obligors voluntarily bear in terms
of child-related expenses over and above their mandated child
support obligations found that many noncustodial fathers,
including noncustodial fathers who spend little time (less than
30%) with their children, provide direct financial support to
their children over and above their child support
obligations. 184 Similarly, a 1993 study found that divorced
parents modify their child support arrangements in response to
changing circumstances and that a substantial minority of
divorced parents informally modify (i.e., modifications not
reported to the court) the presumptive child support obligation
184 William V. Fabricius & Sanford L. Braver, Non-Child Support
Expenditures On Children By Nonresidential Divorced Fathers: Results Of
A Study, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2003).
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within a few months of divorce; further, in both instances,
these deviations are predominately upward.1
85
Some upward deviations are the product of
negotiations during divorce proceedings. 86  For example,
noncustodial fathers may bargain for more visitations in return
for paying increased child support, or for more favorable
property division in exchange for increased child support
payments. 187  In most instances, it is the presence of one
higher earning parent that leads to such bargaining. 188 In line
with this observation, studies of higher-income cases
demonstrate that higher-income parents tend to deviate from
the guidelines in favor of considering the unique aspects of
their specific circumstances, especially when the current
guidelines do not extend to their financial situation, as
discussed in Part IV.B. 189 Also as noted in Part IV.B, judges
endorse such deviations from the guidelines, especially when
presented with one higher-earning parent.t9°  In addition,
evident by the discussion of the current treatment of higher-
income obligors, sometimes judges are forced to deviate from
the guidelines in setting child support obligations because the
guidelines do not extend to the income level of the divorcing
couple appearing before the judge.
Some deviations are the product of informal
negotiations months or years after a divorce is finalized. For
example, there is evidence that while generally believing that
the child support system is productive and compliance with
the formal system is important, lower-income parents tend to
deviate from their presumptive child support obligations when
"they perceive them to be unfair, counterproductive, or
85 H. Elizabeth Peters, et al., Enforcing Divorce Settlements: Evidence
from Child Support Compliance and Award Modifications, 30
DEMOGRAPHY 719, 724 (1993) (finding that 15 to 30 percent of divorced
parents modify the financial portion of their divorce settlement within three
years of divorce, with 80 percent of these modifications constituting
informal changes not reported to the court).
186 Altman, supra note 10.
187 Id. at 495 - 96; Erickson, supra note 10, at 837 - 38.
188 Altman, supra note 10.
189 Hogan, supra note 11.
190 Id.
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punitive. '' 91 In recognition of the poor noncustodial fathers'
financial situation, custodial mothers will accept in-kind
payments, such as diapers, toys, clothing, and shoes, in
exchange for formal cash child support payments.' 92 Some
noncustodial fathers, both poor and more financially able,
have emphasized that they prefer these in-kind payments to be
recognized as fulfilling a portion of their child support
obligation because such payments allow them to feel they
have more control over how their money is spent and because
such payments provide their children with tangible reminders
of them. 193 While in the case of poor noncustodial fathers,
custodial mothers may informally negotiate with the
noncustodial fathers to allow such payments to be recognized
as fulfilling a portion of the fathers' support obligations, in the
case of more financially able fathers, custodial mothers may
view such in-kind payments as a necessary addition to the
child support obligations yielded by the guidelines, thereby
requiring that middle and high income fathers pay more in
child support than that mandated by the guidelines, with the
fathers agreeing to do so by way of in-kind payments.
Accordingly, in a percentage of cases involving middle
or high income parents, it can be assumed that the presumptive
guidelines will be used merely as guidance. Such an
assumption appears valid in light of evidence that lower
absolute child support obligations have no impact in terms of
compliance among middle and high income noncustodial
fathers. 194 The next part of this article connects this evidence
concerning deviation from the presumptive obligations yielded
by the child support guidelines and the evidence regarding
obligor payment characteristics with the obligations yielded by
the currently enacted child support guidelines to present a case
for the Cost Shares model.
191 Waller and Plotnick, supra note 167, at 90.
192 Id. at 100.
193 Id.
194 CROWLEY, supra note 9, at 165; Bartfeld and Meyer, supra note 183.
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V. The Case for the Cost Shares Model
Currently enacted child support guidelines focus
primarily on preserving children's pre-divorce standard of
living, debating how best to balance the trade-offs implicit in
splitting one household into two after starting from this
assumption. Alternatively, guidelines could incorporate an
assessment of the ability of obligors to pay their obligations
into this balancing. One proposed child support guideline
does this. By calculating child support obligations based on
what parents spend on children post-separation, the Cost
Shares model implicitly takes into account ability to pay. It is
this consideration which leads it to yield obligations that not
only are more likely to be paid, but also that are more likely to
generate greater payment amounts on average based on
evidence of when obligors pay or do not pay their obligations
even when they are financially able to pay. This makes the
Cost Shares model a better alternative to current guidelines.
Though generating greater child support payment
amounts could be achieved by increasing individual child
support obligations yielded by guidelines, which proposals
such as the ALI's Principles do, it is perhaps better achieved
through encouraging actual payment of obligations.
Combining the payment and deviation characteristics
discussed in Part IV indicates that child support guidelines
themselves, and not merely enforcement mechanisms, can
encourage payment. This synthesis consists of three
postulates.
First, even though lower income noncustodial fathers
do have the financial ability to pay a portion of their child
support obligations, when faced with the inability to fulfill
their entire obligations, some are dissuaded from making even
a portion of the required payments, although they would fulfill
their obligations if they were financially able to meet them in
their entirety. 195 It is reasonable to postulate that child support
195 See generally Kimberly A. Folse, The Child Support Obligation, Non-
Custodial Parental Income And Compliance: Data Collection Strategies,
26 J. Soc. SERV. RESEARCH 39 (1999) (noting that "[i]f full payment is the
goal, then maybe having an order that is lower than the standard amount
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guidelines which yield slightly lower obligations than
currently enacted guidelines may allow a portion of these
lower-income fathers to be financially able to pay their entire
child support obligations, thereby providing more children
with support. Though inevitably a percentage of lower-
income fathers will choose not to pay their obligations for
reasons unrelated to the numerical amount, such guidelines,
like the Cost Shares model, have the potential to address a
sizable proportion of non-payment by lower-income obligors.
Second, a minority of noncustodial fathers who have
the financial means to pay their obligations refuse to do so for
reasons unrelated to the numeric obligations. It is reasonable
to postulate that their non-payment cannot be addressed by
child support guidelines, an assumption that is confirmed by
evidence that lower absolute obligations have no impact on
compliance among middle and high income noncustodial
fathers.19
6
Third, a proportion of middle and high income
divorcing parents deviate upwards from or otherwise modify
the presumptive obligations yielded by the guidelines. It also
is reasonable to postulate that child support guidelines that
provide lower obligations across the obligor income spectrum
will not cause a sizable percentage of other financially able
noncustodial fathers to modify their child support payments
downward along with the revised guidelines; rather, they will
continue paying what they had been previously. And perhaps,
when taken in aggregate, those that do decrease their
payments will be offset by increased payments by those
higher-income obligors who formerly believed their
obligations to be too high and, thus, refused to pay. Hence,
enactment of child support guidelines that provide lower
obligations across the obligor income spectrum, such as the
Cost Shares model, likely will have little impact on payment
by higher-income obligors.
could be conducive to better payment, or better still, full payment" by
lower-income obligors).
196 Crowley, supra note 9.
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Combining these postulates, it is evident that lowering
presumptive child support obligations has the potential to
increase payment of child support in the aggregate,
particularly to children from lower-income households
because it is lower-income obligors whose net payment
amounts will increase the most when presumptive obligations
are lowered. More lower-income obligors will be financially
able to pay their obligations, while many higher-income
obligors will continue paying the level of support that is
already an upward deviation from or other modification of the
current guidelines. Those higher-income obligors who do
decrease their payments may be supplemented by increased
payments from other higher-income obligors who previously
felt their obligations to be too high. Though some obligors
will decrease their payment levels along with the lower
presumptive obligations, the aggregate decrease likely will not
be as great as the aggregate increase in money paid by
previously noncompliant obligors. Because it is
predominately lower-income obligors who will adjust their
payment rates if presumptive obligations are lowered, even if
the aggregate decrease is slightly higher than the aggregate
increase, it may be asserted that lowering presumptive child
support obligations still advances the aggregate best interests
of children, because, as a whole, the child support system has
the most interest in encouraging payment to children from
lower-income households. It is these children that likely are
most in need of the money that is not being paid under current
guidelines, and it is these children who will benefit in
aggregate from lowering child support obligations.
Briefly returning to the discussion in Part lII.C
regarding who "should" support which guidelines, this
exploration demonstrates that custodial parents, non-custodial
parents, and child advocates should all support guidelines that
yield lower child support obligations. Non-custodial parents
should be in favor of such guidelines because they require
them to pay less money. Similarly, child advocates, when
taking a more nuanced view of what is best for the children
whose interests they are advancing, also should favor such
guidelines. Finally, perhaps most counter intuitively, the
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welfare of custodial parents, who predominately are mothers,
may increase under such guidelines.
Though it has been asserted that the post-divorce
standards of living of mothers and fathers are divergent and,
accordingly, inequitable,197 some commentators have offered
evidence that the so-termed "gender gap" has diminished
considerably since the enactment of child support
guidelines.198  Like some children receiving child support,
some individual custodial mothers would experience a
decrease in their standard of living and, individually, believe
that the "gender gap" had widened, but, aggregately, based on
the contention that the lowering presumptive child support
obligations has the potential to increase child support
payments, custodial mothers should experience an increase in
their standard of living. Hence, guidelines that yield lower
child support awards have the potential to further decrease the
"gender gap."
Choosing specific child support guidelines necessarily
requires making policy decisions about what interests should
be elevated and what interests should be sacrificed. A strict
and unyielding focus solely on the ability of parents to pay
their obligations is not the best way to approach the setting of
child support obligations. Rather, a view towards payment
ability-and concomitantly, what leads obligors to not pay
despite their ability to do so-should be incorporated into an
evaluation of child support guidelines. New guidelines could
be created or current guidelines could be tailored to better take
into account these observations about payment characteristics.
197 See Judi Bartfeld, Child Support and the Postdivorce Economic Well-
Being of Mothers, Fathers, and Children, 37 Demography 203 (2000)
(finding "that custodial mothers and children fare dramatically worse than
noncustodial fathers"); Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of
Living After Divorce: Vanishingly Small?, 33 FAM. L. Q. 111, 134 (1999);
Sorensen, supra note 161, at 791 (finding that "custodial mothers are much
more likely to be poor than nonresident fathers").
198 Braver, supra note 197; Kimberly Folse & Huge Varela-Alvarez, Long-
Run Economic Consequences of Child Support Enforcement For The
Middle Class, 31 J. OF Soc. ECONS. 273 (2002) (concluding that in the case
of middle income parents "it is the noncustodial parent, usually the father,
who suffers the most").
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However, the Cost Shares model already considers ability to
pay, while still primarily determining how best to split the
decrease in standard of living inherent in dividing one
household into two, similar to all enacted guidelines and as
newly created guidelines would seek to do.
Even though the Cost Shares model's lower
obligations will lead to some individual children receiving less
child support, a tradeoff must be made. While it may be
argued that the Cost Shares model is not in the best interest of
an individual child (as it may not be in the best interest of an
individual custodial parent), evidence of obligor payment
characteristics and evidence concerning deviations from the
presumptive child support obligations yielded by the
guidelines indicates that the Cost Shares model may be in the
best interests of children when they are viewed as a group.
This is particularly salient for children with lower-income
parents, who, when considered as a group, would benefit the
most from increased child support payments. Accordingly,
the Cost Shares model should be viewed as a better alternative
to currently enacted child support guidelines: it most likely
provides more child support for children on average, while
still preserving the insights into balancing upon which current
guidelines are premised.
VI. Conclusion
The Family Support Act of 1988 marked an important
development in child support. Since its enactment, states have
adopted three prevailing types of child support guidelines,
thereby addressing the award level and consistency and case
processing efficiency problems that plagued the child support
system prior to the Act. Indeed, the mandated guidelines
generally have been supported and praised for almost two
decades.' 99  However, enacted guidelines all approach the
setting of child support obligations from the perspective of
199 Though the mandated guidelines have been praised by practitioners and
lawyers, they have been criticized by some economists. See generally,
Comanor, supra note 20.
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maximizing individual children's well-being. This approach
overlooks another important element: ability to pay.
When this element is incorporated into an analysis of
child support guidelines, it becomes apparent that there may
be a better alternative to currently enacted guidelines. This
article has argued that the Cost Shares model is one better
alternative, an alternative ready for states to implement
immediately. Although counterintuitive, based on evidence of
obligor payment characteristics and evidence concerning
deviation from the presumptive child support obligations
yielded by the guidelines,- decreasing child support obligations
has the potential to increase the amount of child support paid
in aggregate, thereby providing more support to more
children. In providing lower child support obligations at
almost every level of obligor income, the Cost Shares model
succeeds in balancing among the many interests implicated in
the child support system that other guidelines take into
account while also yielding obligations that encourage
payment. This balancing has the potential to increase the
aggregate amount of child support paid to children, especially
children from lower-income households, who may have the
most to gain from increased payments. In this way, the Cost
Shares model is superior to existing guidelines.
Though this article has made a case for the Cost Shares
model because it already considers what new or revised
guidelines likely would take into account when adding a
greater emphasis on ability to pay to their calculations and
because it can be easily adopted by states, the observations
made in this article are equally applicable to the designing of
new guidelines that seek to balance the interests implicated in
the child support system differently from the Cost Shares
model and other enacted guidelines. What the evidence
presented in this article demonstrates is that any child support
guidelines can be better designed if the goal of establishing
obligations that encourage payment is incorporated into the
analysis. As it is non-payment by lower-income obligors that
is best addressed by lower child support obligations, and the
decrease in payment amounts by some higher-income obligors
is merely a necessary collateral consequence of lowering
Vol. 13:1
Child Support and In(ability) to Pay
obligations in order to facilitate payment by lower-income
obligors, any guidelines that distinguish between lower and
higher-income obligors likely would provide more money to
children in aggregate and also be in the best interests of more
individual children.
For example, guidelines could be tiered, with the
bottom tier yielding lower obligations for lower-income
obligors, similar to those set by the Cost Shares model, the top
tier yielding higher obligations for higher-income obligors,
similar to those set by a "share the pain" approach to child
support favored by the ALI Principles,2 °° and the middle tiers
yielding obligations close to current obligations, similar to
those set by the Income Shares model. Judges could make the
initial determination as to which tier an obligor should fall
under by considering both obligor and obligee income. and
then apply the appropriate guidelines. As with current child
support obligations, obligations could be revised based on
changed circumstances, and judges and parents could treat the
presumptive obligation merely as a floor and deviate upward.
This is but one example of how a more nuanced
approach to child support guidelines can be achieved.
Regardless of exactly how the guidelines tailor obligation
amounts to encourage obligor payment, such incorporation
will advance the welfare of all children in aggregate.
Although any alteration of obligations downwards necessarily
will cause some obligors to adjust their child support
payments downwards along with their decreased obligations,
the trade-offs implicit in choosing child support guidelines
dictate that some impacted parties will be harmed in all
instances. Acknowledging that a choice must be made, based
on payment characteristics of obligors, guidelines such as the
Cost Shares model that either implicitly or explicitly integrate
a view of ability to pay have the potential to provide more
child support for more children, especially children from
lower-income households.
200 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 40, at 117 - 18.
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